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Profiteering Off Public Health Crises:
The Viable Cure for Congressional
Insider Trading
Charles L. Slamowitz*
Abstract
This article takes an approachable, forward-thinking, and
academic dive into congressional insider trading in the wake of
the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. After a confidential
briefing by the Senate Health Committee warned of COVID-19,
massive stock sell-offs by members of Congress and their spouses
suddenly ensued. Some senators even publicly disparaged
COVID-19’s viral effects while their own shares were being
offloaded. By the time the American people were made aware of
its dangers, vast investment holdings by congressional insiders
had already been sold. Shockingly, it is unclear if congressional
insiders trading on confidential coronavirus information are
actually breaking the law. Congress members are also not
required to timely disclose trades, even during pandemics,
leaving the American people in the dark. This article provides
the only viable remedy to congressional insider trading, crucial
for governmental transparency and accountability to
precipitously curb public health crises moving forward.
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I. Introduction
In the wake of an impending global pandemic1 with
momentous economic consequences,2 a confidential briefing by
the Senate Health Committee warned of the novel coronavirus,
SARS-CoV-2 (which leads to the disease called COVID-19).3
Within days, massive stock sell-offs by members of Congress
and their spouses ensued.4 Some senators even publicly
downplayed COVID-19’s viral effects while their own shares
were being offloaded.5 By the time the American people were
1.
The World Health Organization (WHO) later declared COVID-19 a
pandemic. WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on
COVID-19—11 March 2020, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Mar. 11, 2020), https://
perma.cc/U22L-B6WB.
2.
See WARWICK MCKIBBIN & ROSHEN FERNANDO, BROOKINGS INST., THE
GLOBAL MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS OF COVID-19: SEVEN SCENARIOS 2 (2020),
https://perma.cc/6269-NWM4 (PDF). The United States entered a recession in
February according to National Bureau of Economic Research, as a direct
result of COVID-19. See Jeanna Smialek, The U.S. Entered a Recession in
February, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/29QE-MTT2.
3.
See Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Health, Edu., Lab. &
Pensions, Senate Health Committee Announces Briefing to Update Senators
on Coronavirus (Jan. 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/N2DZ-GB9B.
4.
See Sylvan Lane, Four Senators Sold Stocks Before Coronavirus
Threat Crashed Market, THE HILL (Mar. 20, 2020, 8:47 AM), https://perma.cc
/VWG6-5JAH (last updated Mar. 20, 2020, 11:11 AM); Ed Lin, Nancy Pelosi’s
Husband Bought Up Slack, Microsoft, and Alphabet Securities, BARRON’S (Apr.
2, 2020, 12:47 PM), https://perma.cc/2VSS-RQU7.
5.
See Robert Faturechi & Derek Willis, Senator Dumped Up to $1.7
Million of Stock After Reassuring Public About Coronavirus Preparedness,
PROPUBLICA (Mar. 19, 2020, 5:01 PM), https://perma.cc/ADS5-6X22 (last
updated Mar. 25, 2020); Sen. Kelly Loeffler (@KLoeffler), TWITTER (Feb. 28,
2020, 11:20 AM), https://perma.cc/882D-JDCG.
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made aware of its dangers, vast investment holdings by
congressional insiders had already been sold.
Public health crises require the government and its
agencies to take heightened remedial action6 by integrating
transparent communication and accountability.7 But crises
inherently offer opportunities for the government to abuse
power or profiteer.8 Shockingly, congressional insiders trading
on coronavirus information may not actually be breaking the
law. Congresspersons are also not required to timely disclose
these trades, even during pandemics, leaving the American
people in the dark. However, promptly revealing the
transactions is crucial for governmental transparency and
accountability to effectively curb contagion.9 Is there a cure?
6.
See generally Michael Olusegun Afolabi, Pandemic Influenza: A
Comparative Ethical Approach, in 12 ADVANCING GLOBAL BIOETHICS 59
(2018) (discussing government obligations to its citizens during public
health crises); HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC
INFLUENZA: IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (2006), https://perma.cc/5FFE-XJ98 (PDF)
[hereinafter IMPLEMENTATION PLAN]; Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness
and Advancing Innovation Act of 2019 (PAHPAI), Pub. L. No. 116–22, 113
Stat. 905. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 201).
7.
See Bruce Jennings & John D. Arras, Ethical Aspects of Public Health
Emergency Preparedness and Response, in EMERGENCY ETHICS: PUBLIC
HEALTH PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE 1, 6 (Jennings et al. eds., 2016) (arguing
emergency preparedness activities are to incorporate transparent and
accountable decision-making processes); Toni G.L.A. van der Meer & Yan Jin,
Seeking Formula for Misinformation Treatment in Public Health Crises: The
Effects of Corrective Information Type and Source, 35 HEALTH COMM. 560,
560–75 (2020) (stating governments are responsible for timely transparent
information dissemination and in charge against misinformation); WORLD
HEALTH ORG., PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE 41 (2009),
https://perma.cc/J6QJ-NACE (PDF) (determining it is a necessity to maintain
trust to the public through a commitment to transparency and credibility).
8.
See Jennings & Arras, supra note 7, at 13 (“[E]thics and the law [in
the U.S. and many other countries] have always recognized that rights and
liberties can be temporarily overridden during an emergency situation when
substantial harm to others is impending. Such temporary power has the
potential for being extended in unjust ways and abused.”); see also GEORGE J.
ANNAS ET AL., ACLU, PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS: THE NEED FOR A PUBLIC
HEALTH—NOT A LAW ENFORCEMENT/NATIONAL SECURITY—APPROACH 23–24
(2008), https://perma.cc/6QQK-NK6H (PDF) (stating scientific uncertainty in
public health disasters tempt government officials to attempt some form of
a cover-up).
9.
See IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 6, at 16–17; van der Meer &
Jin, supra note 7, at 560–61.
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II. The Faulty Application of Insider Trading Laws to Congress
While senior government officials were once required to
disclose trades in a publicly-accessible electronic manner
pursuant to the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act
of 2012 (STOCK Act), this is no longer the case.10 In 2013, the
STOCK Act was abruptly modified, repealing this
requirement.11 However, a recent holding in United States v.
Blaszczak,12 may conceivably thwart congressional insider
trading
on
confidential
government
information
altogether—like classified COVID-19 information from
closed-door committee meetings. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit upheld the United States Southern District of
New York’s Blaszczak decision convicting four defendants for
using pre-decisional medical reimbursement rate information
from a government agency, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services (CMS), to sell stocks for substantial returns.13
Remarkably, the Court applied Title 18 securities fraud14 and
wire fraud statutes,15 holding (A) confidential information held
by the government can constitute “property” under these
statutes; and (B) the “personal-benefit” test16 does not apply.17
In light of Blaszczak, confidential COVID-19 information
can be considered “property” under certain fraud statutes and
10.
See STOCK Act, Pub. L. No. 112–105, 126 Stat. 291 (2012) (repealed
2013).
11.
Amendment S.716 to the STOCK Act repealed electronic filing
disclosure requirements on April 15, 2013. See STOCK Act, Pub. L. No.
112 – 105, 126 Stat. 291 (2012) (repealed 2013); see also Dan Auble, Action
Alert: STOCK Act Reversal Signed by President, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL.
(Apr. 15, 2013, 1:27 PM), https://perma.cc/X9NU-ZKD5 (reporting the STOCK
Act’s removal of the requirements for online and electronic accessibility of
disclosures).
12.
947 F.3d 19, 26 (2d Cir. 2019).
13.
Id. at 45.
14.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2018) (codifying and detailing securities and
commodities fraud).
15.
See id. § 1343 (providing the elements of fraud by wire, radio, or
television).
16.
The “personal-benefit” test was established in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S.
646, 661–64 (1983).
17.

Id. at 45.
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its use can be prosecuted pursuant to misappropriation or
embezzlement theories.18 A comparison between nonpublic
COVID-19 government information and the nonpublic CMS
government information in Blaszczak could undoubtedly be
drawn. Further, the “personal-benefit” test, which has been
historically difficult to demonstrate, is no longer required under
certain fraud statutes.19 Under the “personal-benefit” test
established in Dirks v. SEC,20 insiders are only convicted of
securities fraud when proven they breached a duty of trust and
confidence by disclosing material, nonpublic information for a
“personal benefit.”21 Similarly, the one who traded on the
information (the “Tipee”) can only be convicted of fraud when it
is shown they utilized the inside information with knowledge
that the tip had been obtained in breach of the insider’s duty.22
The “personal-benefit” test has been altered drastically since
Dirks by subsequent legal decisions, including Newman,23

18.
The Blaszczak majority reasoned that its decision here aligns with
the Supreme Court in Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987), which held
that confidential pre-published Wall Street Journal information constitutes “property.”
See Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 33 (“Here, we find it most significant that CMS
possesses a ‘right to exclude’ that is comparable to the proprietary right
recognized in Carpenter. Like the private news company in Carpenter, CMS
has a ‘property right in keeping confidential and making exclusive use’ of its
nonpublic predecisional information.”).
19.
Blaszczak differentiated the Title 18 and wire fraud statues from the
Title 15 fraud and 10-b5 statutes, with the former not applying to the
“personal-benefit” test. Id. The Court in Carpenter found Title 18 was intended
to provide broader enforcement mechanism to address securities fraud, and
that wire fraud “includes the act of embezzlement, which is . . . the fraudulent
appropriation to one’s own use of the money or property entrusted to one’s care
by someone else.” See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 27.
20.
463 U.S. 646 (1983).
21.
See id. at 663–667.
22.
Id.
23.
See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 447–49 (2d Cir. 2014)
(reanalyzing the Dirks “personal-benefit” test and ruling that a tip and trade
resembles a gift, but only with “proof of a meaningfully close personal
relationship that generates an exchange that . . . represents at least a
potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature” to the tipper).
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Salman,24 and, more recently, Martoma II.25 Nevertheless,
because Blaszczak effectively removed the onerous
“personal-benefit” requirement for the Title 18 and wire fraud
statutes altogether, insider trading cases could conceivably be
brought with more regularity—including against Congress
members trading on confidential COVID-19 information.26
Still, the topical application of Blaszczak invites convincing
counter-arguments by lawmakers. Significantly, the District
Court in Blaszczak required the jury to find the material
information
at
issue
be
knowingly
and
willfully
27
“misappropriated” or “embezzled” by the defendants. Since one
cannot misappropriate from oneself, this protects those who
develop material information on their own.28 Thus, lawmakers
involved in constructing the COVID-19 material could be
exempt from the theory of misappropriation, which generates
broad ramifications. Moreover, while the theory of
embezzlement or conversion may be available, fraud cases that
specifically concern government information are often difficult
to demonstrate, as evidenced by conflicting circuit court
opinions and the lack of legislative guidance.29 Lastly, Blaszczak
24.
Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 428 (2016) (overruling
Newman’s potential pecuniary-gain requirement of the personal-benefit test,
holding it “inconsistent with Dirks,” while not expressly overruling Newman’s
meaningfully close personal relationship aspect).
25.
United States v. Martoma (Martoma II), 894 F.3d 64, 79 (2d Cir.
2018) (holding the “personal-benefit” test may be proven through a gift, a
relationship that suggests a quid pro quo, or an intention to benefit). The
Court further held a “meaningfully close relationship” is not required when
proving a quid pro quo or an intention to benefit. Id.
26.
See John C. Coffee, A Short Primer on the New Law of Insider
Trading, N.Y. L.J. (Mar. 18, 2020, 12:30 PM), https://perma.cc/N7H8-FGWM;
Mark D. Cahn et al., Better the Devil You Know? Tipping Liability, Martoma
and the Rise of 18 U.S.C. § 1348, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June
2, 2019), https://perma.cc/QXC8-L4CU (“In light of . . . the lower bar presented
by the elements of [Title 18], tipping charges under [Title 18] may become
increasingly more common.”).
27.
See Appendix at 1044–45, United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19 (2d
Cir. 2019) (Nos. 18-2811, 18-2825, 18-2867, 18-2878); see also Coffee, supra
note 26 (determining District Judge Lewis Kaplan heroically
placed significant limitations on the scope of § 1348).
28.
See Coffee, supra note 26.
29.
See United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 70–72 (2d Cir. 1979)
(concluding 18 U.S.C. § 641 is proven through “knowingly converting” a “thing
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contains a noteworthy dissent that considers information used
by the government for regulatory purposes to not constitute
“property” at all.30 Arguing that government COVID-19
information is considered “regulatory” and not “property” could
be judiciously contemplated.
III. The Growing Uncertainty Plaguing Insider Trading Cases
It is also important to note that insider trading cases have
been plagued with uncertainty in recent years, casting doubt if
Blaszczak will survive as controlling precedent.31 Indeed,
“stealth overrulings” in insider trading cases now dominate
these principally judicial constructs.32 The legal notion that
cases subscribe to the doctrine of in pari materia, construction
with reference all other applicable statutes, has been
recurrently depreciated in insider trading cases, including
Blaszczak.33

of value”); Jessica Lutkenhaus, Prosecuting Leakers the Easy Way: 18 U.S.C.
§ 64, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1169–79 (2014) (highlighting the ambiguity
over whether Congress intended to prohibit theft and misuse of government
information as a “thing of value” under 18 U.S.C. § 641).
30.
Hon. Amalya L. Kearse dissented in Blaszczak, stating the CMS
government information did not actually constitute “property,” see Cleveland
v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 27 (2000) (holding Louisiana state video poker
licenses were considered to be merely “regulatory” and not constitute
“property”). Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 45–49 (Kearse, J., dissenting).
31.
While it also remains to be seen if the Second Circuit Blaszczak
decision will be adopted by other circuit courts, the Southern and Eastern
Districts of New York are where most insider trading cases take place. See
generally, e.g., Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 19; Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 64;
Newman, 773 F.3d 438; Girard, 601 F.2d at 69.
32.
See Recent Case, United States v. Martoma: Second Circuit Redefines
Personal Benefit Requirement for Insider Trading, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1730,
1730–37 (2019) (reasoning Martoma I and II were stealth reversals of Salman
v. United States, which overruled Newman, that misstated Jiau, and
reversed SEC v. Obus, which stealthily overruled Dirks).
33.
See, e.g., Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 36 (determining that Congress
indicated a contrary intent, so in pari materia does not apply: “Section 1348
was added to the criminal code by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in large part
to overcome the ‘technical legal requirements’ of the Title 15 fraud
provisions.”).
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An insider trading bill currently before the Senate, the
Insider Trading Prohibition Act (H.R. 2534) (the “Act”)34—which
already passed the House of Representatives by a significant
margin—could inject more chronic uncertainty into the already
complex insider trading laws. The Act proposes to reinstate the
“personal-benefit” test in one subsection,35 which may preempt
Blaszczak, while another subsection undermines the
“personal-benefit” entirely by eliminating the requirement to
prove a fiduciary breach for “misappropriation, or other
unauthorized and deceptive taking of such information,”36 akin
to Blaszczak. In light of recent rulings, certain subsections are
at odds. In its current form, the Act’s drafting leaves much to be
desired. Even the most connected insider would forgo betting on
its practical consequences.
Interestingly, however, the Act proposes to amend the
Exchange Act of 1934,37 enforced by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).38 Amending the 1934 Act’s
subsections to more clearly conform to the Blaszczak decision
would further expand the SEC’s governance to have
well-defined standing under Title 18 securities and other fraud
statutes,39 to enact pandemic-specific congressional disclosure
forms. Right now, the SEC’s standing is more clearly defined
under the STOCK Act to show a violation of Rule 10b-5.40 But
charges under the STOCK Act to members of Congress face a
34.
This bill passed the House of Representatives on December 5, 2019,
by a vote of 410 to 13. See Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 2534, 116th
Cong. § 16A (2019).
35.
See id. § 16A(c)(1)(D). Patrick McHenry (R-NC), Ranking Member of
the House Financial Services Committee, reinstated this “personal-benefit”
test back into the Act on the evening of the vote. Id.
36.
See id. § 16AI(1)(C)
37.
15 U.S.C. § 78a–78qq (2018).
38.
The SEC, which was created by Section 78d of the Exchange Act of
1934, enforces other legislation, including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. See
The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. AND EXCHANGE
COMM’N (Oct. 1, 2013), https://perma.cc/87RU-E5UX.
39.
See 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2018); John C. Coffee, The Senator Traded While
His Constituents Died: A Legal Analysis of Insider Trading by Public Officials,
COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG: CLS BLOG ON CORPS. AND THE CAP. MKTS. (Mar.
31, 2020), https://perma.cc/T2RH-P394.
40.
See Coffee, supra note 39.
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myriad of legal and constitutional issues, including the Speech
or Debate Clause in Article I of the U.S. Constitution,41
interpreted by the Supreme Court as “anything generally done
in a session of [Congress] by one of its members in relation to
the business before it.”42 This prevents the obtainment of any
documents or testimony reflecting those acts, which has
previously encumbered the SEC.43 The modified STOCK Act
also lacks the means to compel more immediate and
publicly-accessible disclosures.44
The STOCK Act has been recently asserted in a lawsuit
against Senator Richard Burr (R-NC), the Chairman of the
Senate Intelligence Committee, by a shareholder of Wyndham
Resorts, one of the several companies where Burr offloaded
shares.45 But until this lawsuit plays out, it remains to be seen
if Senator Burr actually broke insider trading laws.46 The
traditional route for prosecuting insider trading cases for
41.

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 1.
Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 311 (1973).
43.
See Christian Garcia & John W.R. Murray, Insider Trading, Congress
and COVID-19: A Renewed Focus on the STOCK Act, JDSUPRA (Apr. 16, 2020),
https://perma.cc/LUM3-HHEA (“Courts have held that the [Speech or
Debate] Clause also prevents the government from obtaining documents or
testimony reflecting those acts.” (citing SEC v. Comm. on Ways & Means of
the U.S. House of Representatives, 161 F. Supp. 3d 199, 242–43 (S.D.N.Y.
2015))).
44.
See STOCK Act, Pub. L. No. 112–105, 126 Stat. 291 (2012) (repealed
2013).
45.
Jacqueline Thomsen, Browne George Ross Attorneys File First
Lawsuit Over Sen. Richard Burr’s Coronavirus-Tied Stock Dumps, NAT’L L.J.
(Mar. 24, 2020, 11:49 AM), https://perma.cc/4VRR-PXMT (stating the lawsuit
was initiated by Alan Jacobson, a shareholder of Wyndham Hotels & Resorts).
46.
Senator Burr is currently under investigation by the Department of
Justice for potential criminal violations of these laws, while similar
investigations into Senators Kelly Loeffler (R-GA), James Inhofe (R-OK), and
Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) concluded in May with no charges being filed. Katie
Benner & Nicholas Fando, Justice Dept. Ends Inquiries Into 3 Senators’ Stock
Trades, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/NJ39-SXUR. After the
FBI raided Senator Burr’s home on May 13, 2020, to seize his cellphone as
part of the insider trading investigation, the senator “stepped aside” from his
post as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Robert Faturechi &
Derek Willis, Richard Burr Steps Down from Chairmanship of Senate
Intelligence Committee, PROPUBLICA (May 14, 2020, 12:45 PM), https://
perma.cc/B3GG-H89Q.
42.

40

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 31 (2020)

members of Congress has been through classic insider trading
laws, including by the Department of Justice (DOJ).47 Notably,
the DOJ has opened and swiftly dropped investigations into
Senators Kelly Loeffler (R-GA), James M. Inhofe (R-OK) and
Dianne Feinstein (D-CA). Moreover, other members of Congress
heavily involved in trading around COVID-19 were not
investigated or named in lawsuits, such as Senator David
Perdue (R-GA), who reportedly made a series of 112 stock
transactions sold for around $825,000 and buying stocks worth
$1.8 million, including a company directly involved in the
provision of personal medical equipment, on the same day as the
Senate briefing on March 2, 2020.48 Interestingly, Senator
Perdue was also named to the President’s coronavirus task
force.49
While an investigation against Senator Burr did not
entirely cease as of yet, many surmise this investigation is
politically motivated and not necessarily grounded in the basis
of insider trading laws for congressional members and for good
reason. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the sole
congressional insider trading investigation remaining against
Senator Burr is political and not grounded in any established
legal framework. The investigation of Burr’s trading is
reportedly being handled by the Justice Department’s Public
Integrity Section, along with the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the
District of Columbia, instead of the U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York’s office, which customarily works
on high-profile insider trading cases, raising concerns that the
investigation might not be handled competently or

47.
See MICHAEL V. SEITZINGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21127,
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING 1–13 (2016) (providing a detailed
overview of the federal statutes related to insider trading, such as the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the STOCK Act, etc., along with seminal
insider trading decisions).
48.
Sheth Sonam, Sen. David Perdue Bought Stock in a Company that
Produces Protective Medical Equipment the Same Day Senators Received a
Classified Briefing on the Coronavirus, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 6, 2020, 6:25 PM),
https://perma.cc/H9G6-5CUQ.
49.
Tia Mitchell, Perdue, Loeffler to Advise Trump on Post-Pandemic
Economy, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Apr. 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/2VJV-3QHD.
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independently.50 Senator Burr has fallen out of favor with
Present Trump and his constituents for investigating Russia’s
interference in the 2016 presidential election, including issuing
a subpoena to the president’s oldest son, Donald Trump, Jr., and
the releasing of the investigation report in his position as
Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.51 Notably, in a
rare occurrence, more than one-thousand former DOJ
employees accused Attorney General William Barr of political
interference and demanded his resignation, along with
testimony from a still-employed DOJ lawyer accusing the
Attorney General of political interference and other allegations
of political motivation.52
Although former Representative Chris Collins of New York
(R-NY) pled guilty in 2019 and was sentenced to twenty-six
months in jail for violating insider trading charges under Rule
10(b)(5) for telling relatives to sell biopharmaceutical shares, he
obtained the nonpublic information by sitting on the company’s
board, not through his governmental role.53 While stronger
stances on insider trading on COVID-19 information have

50.
Ankush Khardori, The Insider Trading Investigation of Richard Burr
is in Terrible Hands, SLATE (May 20, 2020), https://perma.cc/2MEA-RLX2. See
Sarah N. Lynch & Karen Freifeld, Manhattan Prosecutor Steps Down, Ending
Stand-Off with Attorney General Barr, REUTERS (Jun. 20, 2020, 2:46 PM),
https://perma.cc/Z9K5-9UW2 (reporting, interestingly, that the DOJ had
Geoffrey Berman step down as U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New
York after stand-off presumed related to investigating President Donald
Trump’s personal lawyer, Rudolph “Rudy” Giuliani).
51.
Anita Kumar, Don’t Expect Trumpworld to Rescue Richard Burr,
POLITICO (May 14, 2020, 7:20 PM), https://perma.cc/SN7J-V772. Senator
Marco Rubio (R-FL) has since been placed at the helm of the Committee as the
acting chairman. Patricia Zengerle, Senator Rubio Chosen as Acting
Intelligence Committee Chairman, REUTERS (May 18, 2020, 3:37 PM), https://
perma.cc/4LZY-NP68.
52.
Jerry Lambe, 1,250-Plus Former DOJ Employees Call for
Investigation of Bill Barr’s ‘Role in Ordering’ Use of Force Against Protestors,
LAW & CRIME (Jun. 10, 2020, 3:47 PM), https://perma.cc/77AL-WMNV.
53.
See Jonathan Allen, Former U.S. Congressman Collins Sentenced to
26 Months for Insider Trading, REUTERS (Jan. 17, 2020, 6:07 AM), https://
perma.cc/33M6-6ECG.
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recently been taken by the DOJ54 and SEC,55 these stances do
not explicitly pertain to members of Congress. Nor does this
retroactively remedy the bereft American people who were
unaware of the drastic economic impact while Congress
members’ shares were sold. Stronger stances alone are simply
not enough here. But, it is a start.
The United States Senate Select Committee on Ethics,
which is vested with the power to oversee government insider
trading, has been called to investigate including none other than
Senator Burr.56 Remarkably, Senator Burr, already discovered
withholding information from the public,57 asked the Ethics
Committee to investigate, claiming he “relied solely on public
reporting to guide [his] decision to sell the stock.”58 Burr
co-sponsored the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness and
Advancing Innovation Act (PAHPAI),59 2019 legislation aimed
to improve the nation’s preparation and response to natural and
man-made public health threats.60 As a pandemic expert of the
54.
See Memorandum from William Barr, Attorney General, for All
United States Attorneys 2 (Mar. 16, 2020) (“Every U.S. Attorney’s Office is
thus hereby directed to prioritize the detection, investigation, and prosecution
of all criminal conduct related to the current pandemic.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee law Review).
55.
Stephanie Avakian & Steven Peikin, Statement from Stephanie
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Senate, Burr certainly appreciated that the confidential
COVID-19 information he obtained was material. The fact that
Burr is requesting an Ethics Committee investigation
elucidates the significantly muddled distinction between public
and nonpublic information for the purposes of congressional
insider trading.
Indeed, guidance from the Senate Ethics Committee on the
STOCK Act’s insider trading prohibition acknowledges how
common detecting nonpublic information in the Senate can be:
“[W]hile Senators and staff are prohibited from using nonpublic
information for making a trade, a great deal of Congressional
work is conducted on the public record or in the public realm
during committee hearings and markups, floor activity, and
speeches.”61
The Committee on Ethics disclosed an important issue
here—it is hard to determine if lawmakers get their information
in a nonpublic briefing or in public proceedings. In Senator
Burr’s case, he claimed that the public market guided his
decisions.62 Further, closed-door meetings may use information
obtained from publicly-disclosed global sources, making actual
violations difficult to verify. The Ethics Committee also does not
have a broad-based predictable framework or enforcement
mechanism, nor does it facilitate immediate and
easily-accessible trading disclosures to the public. Thus,
expecting wide-spread, demarcated, and pandemic-specific
congressional oversight by the Ethics Committee as a practical
solution is implausible.
A more drastic position—that members of Congress be
prohibited from trading altogether—is becoming more widely
held, a view shared by some members of Congress and a former
drafter of the STOCK Act.63 Congress members Raja
Krishnamoorthi (D-IL), Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY), and
Joe Neguse (D-CO) have proposed reintroducing the Ban
61.
See Memorandum from the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Ethics
to All U.S. Senators (Dec. 4, 2012) (providing guidance on restrictions on
insider trading under securities laws and ethics rules) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
62.
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63.
See Tyler Gellasch, I Helped Write the STOCK Act. It Didn’t Go Far
Enough, POLITICO (Mar. 25, 2020, 3:50 PM), https://perma.cc/TAN3-CFYQ.

44

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 31 (2020)

Conflicted Trading Act (S. 1393)64 (the “Bill”), initially
introduced by Senator Jeff Merkley (D-OR) in May 2019. The
Bill proposes barring members of Congress, along with their
senior staff, from buying or selling individual stocks or other
investments while in office, among other requirements and
prohibitions.65 The individual holdings would need to be
liquidated within six months of the Bill’s enactment, and new
members of Congress would have six months to sell from when
they join, or else, the investments must be transferred to a blind
trust or held throughout their entire tenure in office.66 The
ambitious legislation overseeing Congress members and their
senior staff may be regarded as overbearing, extreme, or
political Democratic partisanship without additional support,
rendering it unpassable. Compromise and political conciliation
would undoubtedly need to be attained.
Shockingly, Senator Kelly Loeffler (R-GA), who has been
accused of insider trading on COVID-19 information,67 recently
pledged to liquidate all of her stock options due to public
backlash, while contending that she did nothing wrong.68 But
Loeffler may be an outlier since she was appointed to President
Trump’s coronavirus task force on reopening America and is
running for special election in a hotly contested Senate race.69
On the other hand, several other members of Congress accused
of insider trading have not conceded to selling their shares,
64.
65.
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including Senator Burr, despite many calling for his resignation
(pursuant to recent developments, he would now be succeeded
only by someone from his own party if leaving office before his
term expires).70
IV. Curing Congressional Insider Trading
In its current state, the legitimacy of whether members of
Congress trading on nonpublic COVID-19 information will be
successfully prosecuted for insider trading remains unknown.
More significantly, the present measures available fall short of
enforcing
essential
government
transparency
and
accountability by government during pandemics. But there is a
cure: enact timely heightened pandemic-specific securities
disclosure requirements for members of Congress in an easily
publicly-accessible manner.
Since public health crises inherently offer opportunities for
governments to abuse power or profiteer,71 codifying
pandemic-specific requirements is that much more significant.
Indeed, curtailing congressional insider trading during public
health crises is already ensconced in our ethical and
constitutional frameworks.72 Importantly, enacting heightened
disclosure requirements that are limited to public health crises
also outweighs countervailing national security concerns. It is,
indeed, a more sensible solution than prosecuting all
congresspersons alleged of insider trading, barring them from
owning any securities, or doing nothing. By enacting
pandemic-specific congressional disclosure requirements, a
more transparent and accountable government narrative
emerges. Its implementation is the next step.
Enacting timely heightened congressional disclosure
requirements can be accomplished through amending the
Insider Trading Prohibition Act, legislation already pending
70.
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Can Replace Burr, THE NAT’L MEMO (Mar. 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/5JK54CD5.
71.
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before the Senate. Clarifying that “property” includes
government information, and that the “personal-benefit” test is
not required for certain fraud statutes like misappropriation,
embezzlement, or conversion, modeling Blaszczak, would
deliver the requisite modifications. Adjusting the reintroduced
Ban Conflicted Trading Act to include these provisions could
also work. Or, a new bill can be introduced entirely.
Alternatively, members of Congress could do the unthinkable:
timely and publicly disclose the information themselves. But all
jokes aside, by incorporating veritable legislation of
pandemic-specific congressional securities disclosures, our
agencies will make the enactment a reality. This way, the
American people—through the economy and media—have the
opportunity to recognize the true impact that the next pandemic
might have. Before it is too late.
The profound impact of COVID-19 is irrefutably changing
our country and our world. A more transparent and accountable
government to counteract public health crises has never been
more essential. Enacting pandemic-specific congressional
disclosure requirements is the cure.

